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Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate 
two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that 
people  vote  at  the  start  of  their  life,  and  characterize  the  preferred  rate  of  taxation  that  finances  a 
Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex and marital status. We allow for two 
types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. Marriage pools both wage and longevity 
differences between men and women. Hence singles tend to have more extreme preferred tax rates than 
couples. We show that the majority voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner 
couples and on the size of derived pension rights. 
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Most pension schemes provide bene￿ts that are longevity-invariant and sometimes contribution-
invariant. Given that men have a shorter life expectancy than women and earn, and thus
contribute, more, it is clear that such pension systems are to their detriment. So why do men
consistently agree with pension schemes that penalize them? The ￿rst answer one can o⁄er is
that women outnumber men and can impose their views. Another possible reason is that, with
￿ at-rate bene￿ts, low-income men may support such schemes if earnings di⁄erences dominate
longevity di⁄erences. Yet the best alternative explanation might be that, in a society where a
majority of men and women are married, longevity and earnings di⁄erences are pooled within
the couple and this makes any sex war irrelevant.
Women live longer than men and they earn less than men on average. For instance, in France,
it is estimated that women life expectancy at 60 is 20% higher than that of a man and that
the pay gap is around 20%. At the same time, there is evidence that low-income people, men
and women, have lower longevity than high-income people. This has led to studies that show
that social security schemes that look redistributive, but provide longevity-invariant bene￿ts,
are in fact not so redistributive (see e.g. Coronado et al., 2000, Liebman, 2001, and Bommier et
al., 2006). For example, Bommier et al. (2006) estimated that the redistribution in the French
public pension system is reduced by up to 50% because it is longevity-invariant.
Social Security redistribution by marital status is also surprisingly large. For instance,
Galasso (2002) showed that one-earner couples get the highest internal return from the Social
Security, followed by two-earner couples with 70/30 earnings split; returns are equal for two-
earner couples with a 50/50 earnings split and single women, while single men are the most
disadvantaged. The di⁄erence in returns observed between singles and married couples, either
one-earner or two-earner, can be explained by the so-called ￿derived pension rights￿ . Several
countries, like France, provide the surviving spouse (more often the woman) with a survivor
bene￿t, while some other countries provide one-earner couples with a higher replacement rate
than the one applied to single men; some countries, like Belgium or Japan, provide both types of
derived bene￿ts.1 The marital status and the generosity of the system towards the non-working
spouse is then likely to play an important role in the support for a pension system.
1For example, in Belgium, the supplementary pension is evaluated to 1/4 of the working spouse pension. As
shown in Gruber and Wise (1999), derived pension rights may take very di⁄erent forms depending on the country.
1A number of political economy papers have attempted to explain existing pension systems
using majority voting models.2 In his seminal contribution, Browning (1975) focused on age
di⁄erences and showed that, if the old favour generous pensions and the young prefer private
savings, the decisive voter is the median age one. More recent models include wage di⁄erences
alongside age di⁄erences. In such a framework, Casamatta et al. (2000) show that the pension
system is chosen by a majority made of rich and poor workers who collude against a coalition
of retirees and middle class workers: this is the so-called ends against the middle outcome.
In this paper we concentrate on two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital
status. We characterize the pension scheme that is chosen by majority voting in a society where
men live shorter and earn more than women, and most men and women are married. Assuming
that retirement consumption is ￿nanced by the returns of private savings and a Beveridgean
pension bene￿t, we explore several issues: i) the e⁄ect of longevity and wage gender gaps on the
chosen tax rate, ii) the e⁄ect of an increase in the number of married couples on the size of the
pension system, iii) the e⁄ect of an increase in the relative number of one-breadwinner (versus
two-breadwinner) couples on the pension system, and iv) the e⁄ect of the individualization of
pension rights (equivalently, the reduction of derived pension rights) on the size of the chosen
tax rate.
These issues are certainly relevant for prevailing pension systems and, surprisingly, have
hardly been addressed in the literature.3 In particular, the generosity of the system towards
non-working spouses may play an important role in the political support of one-breadwinner
couples towards existing pension systems.4 This is a timely topic to address. Indeed, women
are increasingly participating in the labour force and pension systems are increasingly indi-
vidualized. For instance, more and more countries are abandoning the ￿derived pension rights
model￿and adopting instead the so-called ￿adult worker model￿ . For example, Denmark has
suppressed survivor bene￿ts and Germany has moved towards a ￿family splitting￿system, which
also provides a compensation for interrupted careers (for example, a pension credit per child).5
One can thus expect that this dual evolution (i.e. increased labour participation by women and
individualization of pension rights) will have some incidence on the size of the pension system.
2For good surveys, see Galasso and Profeta (2002) and de Walque (2005).
3See however Borck (2007) and Leroux (2008) who have introduced longevity di⁄erentials in political economy
models of social security.
4For a good survey on the role of derived pension rights on old-age income security of women in OECD
countries, see Choi (2006).
5On this, see Choi (2006), Veil (2007) and Bonnet and Geraci (2009).
2The setting we adopt is standard. People live for two periods, the second one being of variable
length. They work in the ￿rst period and retire in the second one. The retirement consumption
depends on the amount of private savings but also on the pension bene￿t, which is chosen
through voting. To keep the analysis tractable, we make a number of simplifying assumptions
like, for instance, a quasi-linear utility function, no liquidity constraints and certain length of
life. Individuals vote at the beginning of their life. All men have the same longevity, which
is lower than that of women. Men and women have the same productivity, but the wage of
women is only a ￿xed fraction of that of men. Later in the paper, we discuss the implications
of assuming a continuous productivity distribution instead. We also assume positive assortative
mating (i.e. men marry women who have the same underlying productivity but earn a given
fraction of their wage).6 Finally, the pension system is Beveridgean so that pension bene￿ts and
payroll tax rates are uniform.
In this framework, lower productivity and higher longevity individuals bene￿t from the
existence of a pension scheme. Thus, single women, who have lower wages and longer lives, will
be in favour of a pension scheme while single men, who have higher wages and shorter lives, will
be against it. We then explore the role of couples. If the couple comprises two breadwinners,
gender di⁄erences in wages and longevity are neutralized so that the couple gets a zero net
bene￿t from the pension system. In this case, they are indi⁄erent between public pensions
and private savings as a mean of smoothing consumption between periods. However, because
labour supply is endogenous in our setting, a pension system creates labour supply distortions
so that they end up preferring a zero tax rate. On the contrary, one-breadwinner couples do
not neutralize gender di⁄erences and they will be in favour of a generous pension system when
derived pension rights are important and su¢ cient to outweigh the husband￿ s net contribution
to the pension system. Thus, the support for a pension system will depend both on the number
of one-breadwinner couples and on the generosity of the pension system towards them. We
further extend our model to allow for a continuous productivity distribution. Our results are
robust to this new speci￿cation. The only di⁄erence is that now, for each type of household,
some individuals (the ones at the bottom of the productivity distribution) are always in favour
of a pension system due to the amount of income redistribution they obtain.
Finally, our model predicts that the recent trend towards the individualization of pension
6The papers of Mare (1991), Pencavel (1998) and Qian (1998) ￿nd strong evidence of positive assortative
mating with respect to education. Education can be regarded as a good proxy for income.
3rights should lead to reduced payroll tax levels. On the contrary, our model does not give clear
conclusions regarding the e⁄ect of an increase in the number of two-breadwinner couples, which
may imply an increase or decrease in the preferred tax rate depending on the generosity of the
system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a standard political econ-
omy model where individuals di⁄er in wages and longevity. Section 3 introduces gender and
marriage. In Section 4 we allow for productivity di⁄erences and in the last Section we discuss
the assumptions made in our model and some possible extensions.
2 The basic model
We assume that individuals live for two periods. They work in the ￿rst period and retire in the
second one. Each individual of type i is characterized by a pair (wi;￿i); where wi is the labour
productivity in the ￿rst period and ￿i is the length of the second period of life.7
The intertemporal utility function of any individual of type i is quasi-linear (linear in the
￿rst-period consumption) and is represented by
ui (ci;di;li) = ci ￿ v (li) + ￿iu(di);
where ci and di denote the ￿rst- and second-period consumptions, respectively, and li is labour
supply. Second-period utility function u(:) is such that u0 (:) > 0 and u00 (:) < 0. For simplicity,
we assume that the disutility of labour v (li) is quadratic and equal to l2
i=2 . Individuals work,
contribute to the pension system, consume and save in the ￿rst period. In the second period,
they retire and receive a pension bene￿t p. We also assume a perfect annuity market and a zero
interest rate so that the return on savings is simply 1=￿i. First- and second-period consumptions
can then be written as





where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the payroll tax rate and si is the amount of savings.
7It would be possible, but more complicated, to allow for uncertain mortality, ￿i being then the probability of
surviving the second period. We believe that it would not modify substantially our conclusions.
4Throughout the paper, we assume away liquidity constraints so that si can be positive as







ci = (1 ￿ ￿)wili ￿ si
di = si
￿i + p
From the ￿rst-order conditions, we obtain:
l￿
i = (1 ￿ ￿)wi;
u0 (d￿
i) = 1:
As to the pension bene￿t, we assume that individuals contribute to the pension system
during the ￿rst period of their life and receive a ￿ at pension bene￿t in the second period (i.e.







where ni denotes the relative number of individuals of type i. Note that here p is an annual
pension bene￿t, which implies that a person that lives longer gets more in total than a person











is the average square productivity.9 Every individual contributes an amount that is
proportional to his labour income and receives a uniform pension bene￿t during a retirement pe-
riod of unequal length ￿i. Such a pension system redistributes resources from high-productivity
to low-productivity individuals and from short-lived to long-lived individuals.10
The indirect utility function of an individual of type i is then














where the star stands for the optimal level. The preferred tax rate of this individual is obtained




8Assuming a pension bene￿t that would be partially contributive would not change the nature of the results
but would complicate the analysis.
9Note that here, the terms ￿wage￿and ￿productivity￿are used indi⁄erently.
10Most PAYG pension schemes exhibit such features. On this topic see, for example, Coronado et al. (2000),
Liebman (2001) and Bommier et al. (2006).
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Figure 1: Separating locus of types for and against a positive payroll tax
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The preferred tax rate of an individual depends on the level of redistribution he expects to get
from the pension system. He may bene￿t from the pension system either because of a longer
life and / or of a lower productivity than the average. Hence, the preferred tax rate of any




=￿ ￿. It is clear that the
lower the wage rate and the higher the longevity the more likely an individual will be in favour




=￿ ￿ gives the separating locus of types for
and against a positive payroll tax and, thus, a public pension scheme. In Figure 1, we represent
this function in the plane (wi;￿i).
To the left of the curve, the (wi;￿i)-types are in favour of a positive tax; to the right, they
are against. It is also worth noticing that, when positive, the most preferred tax rate decreases
with wi and increases with ￿i.
For someone with a zero wage, the most preferred tax rate is equal to 1=2 and not 1. This
is due to the e¢ ciency cost of taxation: 1=2 is the tax that provides the maximum revenue (i.e.
the peak of the La⁄er curve).
6Majority voting raises some technical problems when there are two characteristics. This will
be addressed below by assuming a particular relationship between the characteristics wi and ￿i.
For the time being, we assume that all individuals have the same longevity ￿i = ￿ ￿ and that
the wage rate has a standard density function with median wage below average wage: ￿ w ￿ wm.
We know from Jensen inequality that
p
E [w2] > ￿ ￿. Given that in the relevant range of w, the
most preferred tax rate decreases with w, the Condorcet winner is the tax rate preferred by the
individuals with median wage.
3 Model with unique productivity level
We now assume that individuals di⁄er in gender. We consider ￿rst a society consisting only of
singles, and introduce later the possibility of marriage. We also allow couples to comprise either
one breadwinner or two breadwinners.
We assume that there is a mass 1 of men as well as of women. These are characterized by a
pair (￿;w) for men and a pair (￿f;wf) for women such that
￿f = ￿￿;
wf = ￿w;
with ￿ ￿ 1 and ￿ ￿ 1.11 In other words, we posit that women have a longer life than men
but also obtain a lower wage. Note that, in this section, we assume a unique productivity level,
which implies a wage w for men and a di⁄erent lower wage ￿w for women.12 In this case, the
pension bene￿t (1) is now equal to












w2=2 and ￿ ￿ = (1 + ￿)￿=2.13
11For simplicity, we restrict attention to the most realistic case where ￿ ￿ 1 and ￿ ￿ 1 but the analysis could
be extended to ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 1. We do not explore in this paper why women have a lower wage. We simply
account for the empirical fact that women, on average, have a lower wage than men.
12In Section 4, we relax this assumption to allow for a continuous productivity distribution.
13Note that here, productivity and wage are not equivalent. For men, the two concepts coincide but for women,




represents the average square wage.
73.1 The political equilibrium in a society of singles
Under our assumptions of di⁄erent wage and longevity for di⁄erent genders, using (3), we have
that the preferred tax rates for men and women are, respectively,
￿￿



































A man, who has lower longevity and higher productivity than the average, always prefers a
zero tax rate since he is a net contributor to the pension system. On the contrary, a woman
always gets a net bene￿t from the pension system and votes for a positive tax rate. The
political equilibrium corresponds to the preferred tax rate of the median individual. Hence, if
the number of women was slightly higher than the number of men, the political outcome in a
society composed by singles only would be the preferred tax rate of women: ￿￿ = ￿￿
f.
3.2 The political equilibrium in a society with both singles and couples
We now study the decisions made by a couple. In this paper we adopt the unitary model of
the household (i.e. a model where the household has only one set of preferences).14 Under
such a speci￿cation, spouses play cooperatively and share their resources over their life-cycle. A
two-breadwinner couple thus solves the following problem:15
max
c, d, lm, lf
2c ￿ l2
f=2 ￿ l2
m=2 + (￿f + ￿m)u(d) (A)
s.t. (wlm + wflf)(1 ￿ ￿) + (￿f + ￿)p ￿ 2c + (￿f + ￿)d
where d represents the individual level of (annual) consumption in the second period for each
member of the couple. The labour supply of the husband and the wife are, respectively, l￿
m =
w(1 ￿ ￿) and l￿
f = ￿w(1 ￿ ￿). Note that, under our assumptions, these are independent of their
marital status (i.e. whether they belong to a couple or are single). Hence, the labour supply
14A number of alternatives have been recently suggested, ranging from bargaining to non-cooperative models.
Our choice is mainly guided by the concern for simplicity.
15Note that we do not model endogenous marriage, i.e. the fact that some single individuals may gain from
forming a couple. Given the quasilinearity of utilities, the utility of a couple is the same as the sum of utility of
a single man and a single woman with the same productivity. From a laissez faire perspective, marriage creates
a welfare gain for the woman and a loss for the man, which is reduced when there exists a pension system.
Endogenizing marriage is highly relevant but it is outside the scope of this paper and is left for future work.
8of a woman is always lower than that of a man. This implies that her total contribution to the
pension scheme, ￿w￿, is also lower while she receives a higher total pension bene￿t, ￿￿p ￿ ￿p.
Substituting for l￿
m and l￿
f and p(￿), we obtain the couple￿ s indirect utility function






w2 ￿ (1 + ￿)￿d￿ + (1 + ￿)￿p(￿) + (1 + ￿)￿u(d￿); (5)
where the superscript c2 stands for a couple with two breadwinners and d￿ is the optimal level of
second period consumption.16 Note that the equation of the pension bene￿t (4) is not modi￿ed
by the introduction of two-breadwinner couples since both members contribute to, and bene￿t
from, the pension scheme in the same way as if they were singles. Di⁄erentiating this indirect
utility function with respect to the tax rate ￿, it is straightforward to show that the preferred
tax rate of a two-breadwinner couple is always nil, ￿￿
c2 = 0. Note that, if labour supply were
exogenous, the couple would be indi⁄erent between any level of taxation (it would obtain the
same return from savings as from the pension scheme). When labour supply is endogenous, the
preferred tax rate is zero since, in this case, the pension scheme introduces distortions on the
labour supply (i.e. the individual return from the pension scheme is smaller than the return
from private savings).
We now consider the political equilibrium and assume that a fraction ’ of men and women
are married. The preferred tax rates for single women and men remain the same, since the
existence of couples does not modify the expression of the pension bene￿t, so that ￿￿
m = 0 and
￿￿
f > 0 (as shown before) while ￿￿
c2 = 0. With equal number of women and men, as soon as
some of them are married there is a majority of individuals who favour a zero tax rate and the
political outcome will be ￿￿ = 0.17
3.3 Introducing one-breadwinner couples
3.3.1 The modi￿ed model
Let us now assume that society consists of four di⁄erent categories of households: single men,
single women, couples with two breadwinners and couples with one breadwinner. As in the
previous sections, there is still an equal fraction (1 ￿ ’) of single males and of single females and
a fraction ’ of couples, so that a number 2’ of individuals live in couple. But we now assume
16Note that d
￿ is independent of income changes.
17If the labour supply were exogenous, the couple would be indi⁄erent between any level of taxation and we
would then have had exactly the reverse result, i.e. a maximum tax rate, ￿
￿ = ￿
￿
f = 1 (under the assumption of
a slightly higher number of women than of men).
9that, among these couples, a fraction ￿ is composed of two breadwinners, while a fraction (1 ￿ ￿)
of couples consists of only one breadwinner.18
This breadwinner is always the husband.19 His wife may be entitled to a pension bene￿t in
the retirement period even if she did not personally contribute to the pension scheme. These
bene￿ts, sometimes called derived pension rights, consist of a small supplementary pension plus
a survival pension. We thus assume that she receives a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1] of the full annual
pension bene￿t p(￿) during the second period of her life of length ￿f.20 If ￿ = 0 the spouse
receives nothing in the second period while if ￿ = 1 she gets a full pension. Whatever the value
of ￿; annual consumption is the same for both spouses.
Let us ￿rst explore the problem of a one-breadwinner couple, which is slightly di⁄erent from




m=2 + (￿f + ￿m)u(d) (B)
s.t. wlm (1 ￿ ￿) + (￿￿f + ￿)p(￿) ￿ 2c + (￿f + ￿)d
Only the man supplies labour, with l￿
m = w(1 ￿ ￿). Substituting for l￿
m and ￿f, the indirect
utility function is equal to
V c1 (￿) =
w2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2
2
+ (1 + ￿￿)￿p(￿) ￿ (￿ + 1)￿d￿ + (￿ + 1)￿u(d￿); (6)
where the superscript c1 stands for a couple with one breadwinner.
The expression for p(￿) is now modi￿ed due to the existence of one-breadwinner couples.
To see this clearly, we rewrite the budget constraint as
p[￿ + ￿f (1 ￿ ’ + ’￿ + ￿’(1 ￿ ￿))] ￿ wl￿
m￿ + wfl￿
f (1 ￿ ’ + ’￿):
On the left hand side we have total bene￿ts distributed: every working individual (men or
women) receives a pension p and a fraction ’(1 ￿ ￿) of non-working women receive ￿p. On the
right hand side we have total contributions. In this model men supply labour, whatever their
marital status, but only women who are single or belong to two-breadwinner couples supply
18Note that Section 3.1 is equivalent to assuming ’ = 0, while Section 3.2 corresponds to ’ 2 [0;1] and ￿ = 1.




normalizing the size of the population to 2.






[1 ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿)] + w
2’(1 ￿ ￿) = w
2 ￿
1 + ￿
2 (1 ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿))
￿
.
20The parameter ￿ may account either for a survivor bene￿t or for the higher replacement rate provided to a
one-earner couple than to a single individual. As mentioned in the introduction, such features are observed in
many countries with a public pension scheme.
10labour and thus pay contributions. Using the optimal labour supplies, total contributions are
equal to (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
1 + ￿2 (1 ￿ ’ + ’￿)
￿
w2. Substituting for ￿f = ￿￿ on the left hand side and




1 + ￿2 (1 ￿ ’ + ’￿)
￿
￿ [1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ’ + ’￿ + ￿’(1 ￿ ￿))]
w2.
Note that if we assume a society of only singles (’ = 0), or a society of two-breadwinner couples
(’ = 1 and ￿ = 1), p(￿) is equal to (4) as before. In these cases, we recover the solutions
obtained in the previous subsections.




1 + ￿2 (1 ￿ ’ + ’￿)
￿
[1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ’ + ’￿ + ￿’(1 ￿ ￿))]
: (7)





3.3.2 Preferred tax rates and the political equilibrium




where i accounts for m (single male), f (single female), c2 (two-breadwinner couples) and c1
(one-breadwinner couples). For one-breadwinner couples, the indirect utility function is (6)
while, for the other households, indirect utility functions remain the same and given by (2) and
(5); only the expression for p(￿) is modi￿ed and given by (8). In Appendix B, we derive the
solution for each type of individual and show that the preferred tax rates are equal to:
￿￿
m = ￿￿



















0 if ￿ < ^ ￿c1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿2
￿
1 ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿2 [1 ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿)] + ’(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 + ￿￿)￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿) ￿ 1
2(1 + ￿￿)￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿) ￿ 1
if ￿ > ^ ￿c1
(11)
11where ^ ￿f and ^ ￿c1 are the threshold levels of ￿. Above ^ ￿f, single women prefer a zero tax and
below ^ ￿c1, one-breadwinner couples also prefer a zero tax. As before, the preferred tax rates of
single men and two-breadwinner couples are zero. Their preference for a zero tax rate is here
reinforced by the fact that the pension system now also redistributes towards one-breadwinner
couples. For single women and one-breadwinner couples, the level of preferred tax rate depends
on the value of ￿ (i.e. the level of generosity of the pension scheme towards one-breadwinner
couples). Indeed, single women prefer a strictly positive tax rate only when the system is not
too generous towards the non-working spouse, since more redistribution to the latter is always
to the detriment of single women (they get less from the pension scheme). For one-breadwinner
couples, we obtain the opposite: they will prefer a strictly positive tax rate if the scheme is
su¢ ciently redistributive towards them. If ￿ ! 0, the man in the couple contributes to a system
that is not favourable to him, since he has higher productivity and lower longevity. In this
speci￿c case, the couple obtains almost no survivor bene￿t compensation and they vote for a
zero tax rate. On the contrary, if ￿ is high, the husband￿ s net contribution to the pension scheme
can be compensated by the bene￿t received by his non-working spouse.
We now characterize the political equilibrium level of the tax rate. It depends on the gen-
erosity of the system towards one-breadwinner couples (i.e. on the level of ￿). In Appendix B,
we show that ^ ￿c1 < ^ ￿f. We obtain three possible cases:
￿ If ￿ < ^ ￿c1 < ^ ￿f, preferred tax rates are ￿￿
m = ￿￿
c2 = ￿￿
c1 = 0 and ￿￿
f > 0. In this case, a
majority of individuals prefers a zero tax rate: ￿￿ = 0.
￿ If ^ ￿c1 < ￿ < ^ ￿f, ￿￿
m = ￿￿
c2 = 0 and ￿￿
c1 > 0, ￿￿
f > 0. If ￿ < 0:5, the equilibrium tax rate







c1 i⁄ ￿ >
￿ ￿ ￿2
￿￿2 ￿ ^ ￿
> ￿￿
c1 i⁄ ￿ < ^ ￿
If ^ ￿c1 < ￿ < ^ ￿ (i.e. ￿ is not too high) the chosen tax rate is likely to be the one preferred
by one-breadwinner couples. On the contrary, if ^ ￿ < ￿ < ^ ￿f, the chosen tax rate is
the one preferred by single women. This corresponds to the traditional case of couples
with male breadwinners and non-working housewives who bene￿t from generous derived
pension rights.
12￿ Finally, if ^ ￿c1 < ^ ￿f < ￿, only one-breadwinner couples vote for a positive tax rate, ￿￿
c1 > 0,
while the other categories vote for a zero tax rate so that the political equilibrium is most
likely ￿￿ = 0 (except if the number of one-breadwinner couples forms the majority).
To sum up, the existence of one-earner couples (and their relative number) as well as the
generosity of the system towards them, through the level of the parameter ￿, crucially in￿ uence
the level of tax rate chosen by majority voting. To obtain a positive tax one needs an intermediate
value of ￿, not too high to keep the support of single women, not too low to keep the support
of one-breadwinner couples.
In the next section, we extend our model to take into account di⁄erences in productivity,
not only between genders but also across individuals in general.
4 Model with continuous productivity distribution
In this section we keep the assumption that longevity can take only two values (i.e. ￿ and ￿f
for men and women, respectively). In contrast, we now assume that w is uniformly distributed,
with support [0;1]. The average and the median productivity are then identical and equal to
￿ w = wm = 1=2. Thus, wf (= ￿w) is distributed over [0;￿] with density 1=￿.21 Finally, we
assume positive assortative mating: when a man and a woman form a couple they do so with
someone with the same underlying productivity, which means wages w and ￿w for man and
woman, respectively.22
With the results obtained above in mind, we expect that now every individual at the bottom
of the wage distribution will be in favour of a pension system, since they will bene￿t from
the inherent redistribution. Thus, independently of their marital status and gender, a fraction
of individuals (in each type of household) will vote for a positive tax rate. In contrast, some
individuals, those at the top of the wage distribution, will be against a pension system. To
illustrate our point let us use the histogram representation given on Figure 2.
We have two sets of histograms, one for each case, that represent the proportion of members
of each of our 4 categories who support the equilibrium tax rate and even a higher one. On
the vertical axis we have the frequencies or, following our assumption on the density of w, the
21We could alternatively assume a right-skewed distribution, but this would complicate our model without
providing additional insights.
22Note that independently of their (low or high) productivity, some women do not work, which is due to









































single men 2bw couples 1bw couples single women
Figure 2: Percentage of households in favor of the equilibrium tax or a higher one
productivity involved. Below we provide numerical examples of equilibrium tax rates that are
shown to depend on the relative size of each category. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the four categories have the same size. Not surprisingly the frequency bar of the single men
is the lowest, implying that their cut-o⁄ productivity is also the lowest. The two-breadwinner
couples follow them. Depending on the case, namely depending on the value of ￿, the category
with the highest bar and thus with the highest cut-o⁄ wage is either that of single women or
that of one-breadwinner couples. Given that half the population supports a tax rate equal or
superior to the equilibrium rate, the sum of these bars is equal to one.23 Yet, as Figure 2 shows,
depending on the household category they belong to, more or less individuals will be against it.
4.1 Preferred tax rates




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿);
23In the ￿rst panel, 20% of single men, 40% of two-breadwinner couples, 60% of one-breadwinner couples and
80% of single women are in favor of a tax equal or higher than the equilibrium tax. Given that each category
comprises the same number of voters, this gives half of the population.
14where 1=3 corresponds to the average square productivity. In Appendix C, we show that indi-
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> (1 + ￿￿)￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿)
￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿)
3
(1 + ￿￿) ￿ w2
2￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿)
3
(1 + ￿￿) ￿ w2
otherwise
(15)
where the w relates to the productivity (and not the wage) of the individuals belonging to the
di⁄erent groups m, f, c2, c1.
4.2 Political equilibrium
In order to characterize the political equilibrium, we manipulate expressions (12) to (15) so as
to obtain the wage rate as a function of the most preferred tax rate, instead of the other way
round. With the uniform distribution assumption, this also represents the number of individuals














1 + ￿2wm (￿)
wc1 (￿) =
p
1 + ￿￿wm (￿)
It is straightforward to show that wm (￿) < wc2 (￿) < wf (￿) and that wc2 (￿) < wc1 (￿). How-
ever, whether wc1 (￿) 7 wf (￿) depends on the value of ￿. Indeed, if ￿ < ^ ￿ (as de￿ned in the
previous section), wc1 (￿) < wf (￿): that is, if the system is not very generous towards the non-
working spouse, the number of single women supporting a speci￿c tax rate ￿ is higher than the
number of individuals belonging to one-breadwinner couples that supports the tax rate ￿. On
the contrary, if ￿ is high enough, the opposite happens. These two cases are depicted in Figure
2.
We now turn to the characterization of the equilibrium payroll tax rate under majority
voting. The equilibrium tax rate is de￿ned such that at least one half of the population prefers
this tax rate (or a higher one) to any other lower tax rate. The voting equilibrium tax rate,
￿￿ is then such that the number of individuals with higher wage (and thus who would prefer a







+ 2’￿wc2 (￿￿) + 2’(1 ￿ ￿)wc1 (￿￿) ￿ 1; (16)
where a mass 1 of individuals corresponds to one half of the population. Solving the above























We now illustrate this formula with a numerical example. We take as given ￿ = 0:8, ￿ = 1:2
and ’ = 0:6 and we focus on the incidence of a variation in the number of two-breadwinner
couples (￿) and in the generosity of the pension system (￿) on the equilibrium tax rate. So
doing, we focus on the two phenomenom already mentioned: increasing labor participation of
women and the individualization of pension systems. The results are reported in the Table 1.
16￿ !
￿ #
0 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 1
0 0.2440 0.2527 0.25568 0.2580 0.2599 0.2613 0.2625 0.2634 0.2645
0:1 0.2437 0.2526 0.25571 0.2582 0.2602 0.2618 0.2631 0.2641 0.2654
0:2 0.2438 0.2526 0.25571 0.2583 0.2603 0.2620 0.2633 0.2644 0.2659
0:3 0.2443 0.2527 0.25570 0.2582 0.2602 0.2619 0.2633 0.2644 0.2659
0:4 0.2451 0.2528 0.25567 0.2580 0.260 0.2616 0.2629 0.2640 0.2657
0:5 0.2463 0.2531 0.25563 0.2578 0.260 0.2611 0.2623 0.2634 0.2649
0:6 0.2477 0.2534 0.25558 0.2574 0.2590 0.2603 0.2614 0.2624 0.2638
0:7 0.2493 0.2538 0.25552 0.2570 0.2583 0.2594 0.2603 0.2611 0.2623
0:8 0.2511 0.2542 0.25545 0.2565 0.2574 0.2582 0.2589 0.2594 0.2603
0:9 0.2531 0.2547 0.25536 0.2559 0.2564 0.2568 0.2572 0.2575 0.2580
1 0.255 0.255 0.25527 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255
Table 1: Tax rate levels as a function of gamma and mu
For any level of ￿ < 1, the equilibrium tax rate is increasing in ￿ (i.e. in the generos-
ity towards one-breadwinner couples), which results from the increasing support of the one-
breadwinner couples. In contrast, the variation of the tax rate with ￿ (i.e. the number of
two-breadwinner couples) is ambiguous. For instance, for very low levels of ￿ (< 0:2), the tax
rate is ￿rst decreasing and then increasing in ￿, while for ￿ ￿ 0:3, the tax rate is ￿rst increasing
and then decreasing in ￿. Indeed, when ￿ increases, two forces are playing in opposite directions.
On the one hand, the increase in the number of two-breadwinner couples who prefer a lower tax
pushes the equilibrium tax rate downward but on the other hand it generates more resources
in the economy and increases the tax base (see footnote 19) which pushes the tax up. In our
model, depending on the level of the parameter ￿, one or the other e⁄ect may dominate and the
tax rate will increase or decrease with the number of two-breadwinner couples. This e⁄ect of ￿
on the tax rate is con￿rmed by the tables below.
Hence, regarding the recent trend towards the individualization of pension rights together
with the increase in the number of two-breadwinner couples, our model fails to provide clear-
cut predictions when both move simultaneously, since the e⁄ects of changes in ￿ and ￿ on the
equilibrium tax rate may go in opposite directions.
In the next tables, we study how the equilibrium tax rate varies when the family structure
changes (i.e. when the proportion of couples, ’, and of two-breadwinner couples, ￿, vary). For
this purpose, we ￿rst posit the level of ￿ to be equal to 0:25 (for instance, in Belgium, the
supplementary pension obtained by a one-breadwinner couple is equal to 1/4 of the working
17spouse pension) and then to 0:75. Our results are reported in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
’ !
￿ #
0 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 1
0 0.312 0.2950 0.2859 0.2761 0.2656 0.2543 0.2422 0.2291 0.2151 0.2
0:2 0.312 0.2951 0.2860 0.2761 0.2656 0.2542 0.2419 0.2287 0.2143 0.1986
0:4 0.312 0.2952 0.2861 0.2763 0.2657 0.2543 0.2420 0.2286 0.2140 0.1981
0:5 0.312 0.2952 0.2862 0.2763 0.2658 0.2544 0.2421 0.2287 0.2141 0.1982
0:6 0.312 0.2953 0.2862 0.2764 0.2659 0.2545 0.2422 0.2288 0.2146 0.1983
0:8 0.312 0.2953 0.2863 0.2766 0.2662 0.2549 0.2426 0.2293 0.2148 0.1990
1 0.312 0.2954 0.2865 0.2768 0.2665 0.2553 0.2431 0.2300 0.2157 0.2
Table 2: Tax rate levels for gamma= 0.25
’ !
￿ #
0 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 1
0 0.312 0.2989 0.2915 0.2831 0.2737 0.2629 0.2506 0.2364 0.2197 0.2
0:2 0.312 0.2984 0.2909 0.2828 0.2738 0.2639 0.2529 0.2407 0.2269 0.211
0:4 0.312 0.2978 0.2902 0.2819 0.2731 0.2635 0.2531 0.2419 0.2295 0.216
0:5 0.312 0.2975 0.2897 0.2814 0.2724 0.2629 0.2525 0.2414 0.2293 0.216
0:6 0.312 0.2971 0.2892 0.2807 0.2716 0.2619 0.2515 0.2403 0.2283 0.215
0:8 0.312 0.2963 0.2879 0.2790 0.2694 0.2592 0.2482 0.2364 0.2236 0.210
1 0.312 0.2954 0.2865 0.2768 0.2665 0.2553 0.2431 0.2300 0.2157 0.2
Table 3: Tax rate levels for gamma= 0.75
Before analyzing these tables, let us observe the following:
￿ As we mentioned earlier, when ￿ increases, for given ’ and ￿, there are two e⁄ects: an
increase in the overall tax base and a decrease in the number of couples who are in favour
of a pension system (i.e. the one-breadwinner couples). These two e⁄ects act in opposite
directions. The second e⁄ect is sharper when ￿ is high.
￿ When ’ increases, for given ￿ and ￿, there are three e⁄ects: an increase in the number
of one-breadwinner couples, an increase in the number of two-breadwinner couples, but a
decrease in the overall tax base. The ￿rst e⁄ect leads to a higher tax but the last two to
a lower tax.
Let us now check whether these priors are con￿rmed in the above numerical example. Con-
cerning the ￿rst, we do not obtain a monotonic pro￿le, as it was the case with Table 1. This
18is not surprising given the two countervailing forces at stake. Turning to our second prior, we
￿nd that the equilibrium tax rate always decreases with the number of couples, which implies
that the two negative e⁄ects noted above dominate the third positive one in the example. Note
however that the decline in the equilibrium tax rate is smaller when the generosity towards
one-breadwinner couples, ￿, is high.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced two individuals￿characteristics - gender and marital status
di⁄erences - that are not generally taken into account in political economy models of Social
Security. Our analysis is one of the ￿rst to shed light on the importance of considering the couple
as a distinct economic agent in order to explain the size of a pension system.24 As opposed to
standard political economy models, which only consider single agents, we distinguish between
single individuals, male or female, and couples. We also distinguish between one-breadwinner
and two-breadwinner couples and account for the existence of derived pension rights.
We show that when there are only two wage levels - one for men and a lower one for women
- single men and two-breadwinner couples are always against the pension system. On the
contrary, one-breadwinner couples and single women may be in favour of it depending on the
size of derived pension rights (i.e. the amount of redistribution one-breadwinner couples get
from the pension system). On the one hand, women bene￿t from the pension system because
they have lower wages and higher longevity; on the other hand, one-breadwinner couples bene￿t
from redistribution through derived pension rights. Thus, if derived pension rights are high,
the pension system is favourable to one-breadwinner couples, but this is to the detriment of
single women, who may end up voting for a zero tax (if the pensions rights are too high). We
also generalize our analysis by assuming a uniform distribution of productivity. We ￿nd that
the equilibrium payroll tax should decrease when the system becomes less generous towards
one-breadwinner couples. On the contrary, the e⁄ect of changes in the relative number of two-
breadwinner couples is found to be ambiguous.
Clearly, our paper shows that the marital status and the composition of households in￿ uence
24The closest paper to ours is Recoules (2009), which focuses on the political support for family-friendly policies
(i.e. policies aimed at child-rearing) in a society constituted only of couples and in which there is gender discrim-
ination in the labor market. The degree of discrimination is likely to in￿ uence the size of government spending,
under some conditions.
19the political support for the pension system. Moreover, another important observation of our
paper is that, while two-breadwinner couples neutralize gender di⁄erences in longevity and
wage, one-breadwinner couples do not. If the pension system is generous towards the non-
working spouses, these couples will push for large pension bene￿ts. In that respect, it is worth
noticing the current trend in many countries: the progressive decline in couples with only one
breadwinner and the individualization of pensions systems, which implies less generosity towards
non-working spouses. According to our model, an increasing individualisation of the pension
rights leads to a lower level of payroll taxation while the increasing number of two-breadwinner
couples yields mitigated results.25
In our paper we make a number of simplifying assumptions: no liquidity constraints, labour
supply invariant to the marital status, zero interest rate, actuarially fair annuity, no widowers,
quadratic disutility of labour, quasi-linear utility, uniform density of wages, assortative mating
and no overlapping generations. We do not think that the qualitative results would change if
these assumptions were relaxed; at the same time, it is clear that the analysis would be more
complicated.
Finally, the type of pension system considered in this paper is the Beveridgean one: namely,
a pension system wherein the annual pension is invariant to contributions and longevity. This
does not mean that everyone has the same resources upon retirement. As public pensions
are supplemented by private savings, it includes traditional savings but also all forms of de￿ned
contribution private pensions. An alternative speci￿cation would be the traditional Bismarckian
system (i.e. a pension system in which bene￿ts are related to earnings but independent of
longevity). A further possibility would be a pension system in which pension bene￿ts are related
to both longevity and contributions. Such a system would be akin to private savings. The most
realistic speci￿cation would probably include a mix of Beveridge and Bismarck with bene￿ts
partially related to contributions, with survival pension for spouses without or negligible pension
rights, and minimum pensions. Unfortunately, adopting such a realistic speci￿cation would
signi￿cantly complicate the analysis.
Our model could still be extended in several directions. First, we could investigate the
implications of adjusting the couples￿pension bene￿ts for scale economies. Second, we have
25There is a conjecture that the increasing participation of women in the labor market is accompanied by a
decline in the level of wages. If this were the case the wealth e⁄ect would disappear and we would then expect that
the increase in the number of two-breadwinner couples would lead to an unambiguous decrease in the equilibrium
tax.
20only considered di⁄erences in longevity between men and women but we have not accounted
for the empirical fact that men have, on average, longer life expectancy when married than
when single. Our conjecture is that, taking this second feature into account, would reinforce our
results. The support for the pension system should increase as then, not only a married man
would gain from the bene￿t received by his wife but also he would get bene￿t from a pension
for a longer period than if he had been single.
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22A Preferred tax rate
We solve the following program:
max
￿2[0;1]


















Di⁄erentiating V i (￿) with respect to ￿, we obtain
@V i (￿)
@￿
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿)w2

















< ￿i=￿ ￿, the
solution is interior and the preferred tax rate is equal to (3).
B Model with unique productivity level
Indirect utility functions of the four categories of household are























V c1 (￿) =
w2 (1 ￿ ￿)
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+ (1 + ￿￿)￿p(￿) ￿ (￿ + 1)￿d￿ + (￿ + 1)￿u(d￿);






w2 ￿ (1 + ￿)￿d￿ + (1 + ￿)￿p(￿) + (1 + ￿)￿u(d￿);
with p(￿) given by (8) and E
￿
w2￿
= w2. Preferred tax rates are such that
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23with ￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿) de￿ned by (7). Evaluating @V i (￿)=@￿ at ￿ = 0, we ￿nd that, for male and
two-breadwinner couples, @V f (￿)=@￿ < 0 and @V c2 (￿)=@￿ < 0 so that their preferred tax rate
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1 ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿2 [1 ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿)] + ’(1 ￿ ￿)
;
such that for ￿ < ^ ￿f, the preferred tax rate of a single woman is always positive (resp. if ￿ > ^ ￿f,
her preferred tax rate is null) and for ￿ < ^ ￿c1, the preferred tax rate of a one-breadwinner
couple is always positive (resp. if ￿ > ^ ￿c1, the preferred tax rate is null). Thus, for ￿ < ^ ￿f, the
preferred tax rate level of women is strictly positive and solves the following equality:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2w2 + ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿)w2 = 0:
This yields (10). We use the same procedure for one-breadwinner couples when ^ ￿c1 < ￿. The
solution is interior and solves
￿(1 ￿ ￿)w2 + (1 + ￿￿)(1 ￿ 2￿)￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿)w2 = 0;
which yields (11).
We also show that ^ ￿c1 < ^ ￿f as
1 ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿)




, ￿￿2 [1 ￿ ’(1 ￿ ￿)]
2 < 1 + ’(1 ￿ ￿)
which is always veri￿ed given that the LHS is negative and the RHS is positive.
Finally, we compare (10) and (11) and show that ￿￿
f > ￿￿
c1 if and only if
￿ <
￿ ￿ ￿2
￿￿2 ￿ ^ ￿:
It is straightforward to show that ^ ￿ 2
￿
^ ￿c1; ^ ￿f
￿
.
24C Model with continuous productivity distribution






















f = 0. On the contrary, if 3￿2w2 < ￿￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿), the preferred tax rate is positive
















Using the same procedure for single men, we have that @V m (￿)=@￿j￿=0 < 0 if 3w2 > ￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿)
so that in this case, ￿￿
m = 0, while for 3w2 < ￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿), ￿￿
m 2 [0;1] and is equal to (13).
For two-breadwinner couples, @V c2 (￿)=@￿
￿
￿




otherwise, it is equal to (14). For one-breadwinner couples, @V c1 (￿)=@￿
￿ ￿
￿=0 < 0 if 3w2 >
(1 + ￿￿)￿(￿;￿;’;￿;￿); otherwise the solution is interior and equal to (15).
C.2 Equilibrium tax rate
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